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CIA 60389-a

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT ON SOVIET VULNERABILITIES

PROBLEM

To secure the intelligence support required for the development and implementation of priority plans to shatter the political stability of the present regime in the Soviet Union.

FACTS

1. Several aspects of the problem of shattering the political stability of the present Soviet regime have, for some time, been a matter of concern to the National Psychological Strategy Board (now the Psychological Coordination Board). A working group has been set up under this Board to develop one of the plans related to this problem.

DISCUSSION

2. A good deal of the intelligence required for the plans is now in the possession of U. S. intelligence services but is not consolidated into a finished form suitable for use in attacking the Soviet regime. Other intelligence needed for these activities is possessed by individuals of various backgrounds and experience who are now available for consultation or questioning -- important defectors, students of Soviet affairs, etc. The remainder of the intelligence required is not now available, however, and must still be collected.

3. This intelligence must be collated and analyzed both in order to identify the vulnerabilities of the present Soviet regime to overt-covert attack ~~incoherent~~ and to give maximum assistance to the planners and operators in terms of specific targets.

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4. Tab A presents the types of intelligence considered necessary for the proper development and implementation of these plans. It is probable that in attempting to furnish all this intelligence various problems will arise with respect to the location of responsibility for specific portions of the work. CIA assistance and IAC action may in some cases be required.

5. It is expected that in some instances the lack of information presently available will force the responsible office or agency to develop special collection requirements in order to satisfy the needs of the planners and operators.

6. Without intending in any way to limit the freedom of Intelligence to obtain advice and assistance from individuals outside the Government, it should be mentioned that once armed with the intelligence estimates and studies, the planners and policy officials can then much more easily solicit the views of the individual experts and develop or modify their plans accordingly.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

- 25X1A That the Chairman take this matter up with [ ] and request:
- a. That a national estimate be prepared by the IAC agencies setting forth to the best of their collective abilities at the present time the vulnerabilities of the Soviet regime to overt-covert attacks designed to shatter its political stability. This estimate should be finished by the early part of August;
- 25X1A b. That [ ] make appropriate arrangements, both internally and with the other IAC agencies, to ensure the production of detailed studies on the specific subjects listed in Tab A and such others as may arise from time to time. CIA has indicated its willingness to assist [ ] in this respect.
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